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On 27 October 2016, 740 Samoan workers, mainly young women and 
men from low-income families, were told that their jobs would end the 
following year. They assembled to hear more about the proposed closure 
of Yazaki Electrical Distribution System Sāmoa (yes), the Japanese-owned 
car parts factory where they worked. The meeting took place at the mul-
tipurpose assembly area in the 6.2-acre factory building located in the 
Vaitele Industrial Complex near Sāmoa’s capital, Apia. yes management, 
with a representative from the headquarters of Yazaki Corporation in 
Japan, announced that the company would cease its twenty-six years of 
operations in 2017, with severance packages ready for each employee. 
The assembled workers listened intently to the announcement and then 
bravely sang the patriotic song “Lo Ta Nu‘u (My Dear Country)” to close 
the meeting: 
My dear country where I was born
You are the best in the ocean 
You have received blessings from above; my heritage
Samoans wake up 
Give thanks to Whom has given this to us
Our heritage in the ocean1 
Many workers were relieved, however, to hear that the factory would not 
close immediately and that they could keep their jobs to support their fam-
ilies for at least another few months. Some long-serving workers appeared 
bitterly disappointed that they would lose the company and workmates 
with whom they had established long-lasting attachments.
418 the contemporary pacific • 31:2 (2019)
The news of yes’s closure shocked people in Sāmoa, a small island 
developing state with a high underemployment rate and a limited number 
of jobs available, especially for young early school leavers. Local news 
media addressed some of the expected impacts the closure of yes would 
have on Sāmoa’s economy and employment opportunities, with headlines 
like “Economy to Take a Hit as Yazaki Announces Closure” and “Yazaki 
to Shut, More than 700 to Be Jobless” (Tupufia-Ah Tong 2016a, 2016b). 
Despite the wishes of their employees and the Samoan government, yes 
did in fact cease operations on 25 August 2017 and left Sāmoa. This clo-
sure was a direct impact of the Australian government’s decision to stop 
subsidizing the car manufacturing industry, which led to the closure of 
the Toyota Australia assembly plant in Melbourne, yes’s sole client since 
2007, on 3 October 2017. The closures in Australia and Sāmoa confirmed 
the tendency of capitalist enterprises to seek the lowest-input cost infra-
structure for their activities. The closure of yes in Sāmoa also illustrated 
how multinational companies regard workers in developing countries as 
“disposable commodities” (Braddock 2016). From such a structuralist 
view, low-paid factory workers are typically seen as powerless victims of 
neoliberalism, which undermines their working conditions and promotes 
inequality between core and peripheral economies. However, this study 
offers another perspective: it explores the meaning of both yes employ-
ment and the company’s closure from the point of view of yes’s core 
employees, the young shop-floor operators.
During its twenty-six years of operations, yes, an export-oriented, 
labor-intensive manufacturing plant, employed over sixty thousand local 
workers. Over time, the demographics of the yes workforce changed, but 
young early school leavers appear to have always dominated the position 
of shop-floor operator. They came to yes because, unlike other jobs, the 
operator position did not require specific qualifications or previous work 
experience. This begs the question: Did the closure of yes impact young 
workers in ways other than economically?
This study illustrates the everyday activities of shop-floor operators at 
yes and how these young people used their multinational employment 
to empower themselves. It sheds light on how Samoan factory workers 
exercised their agency, even in somewhat limited ways, against the seem-
ingly irresistible and agentless force of multinational operations driven by 
the quest for profit. I argue that, from the perspective of yes operators, 
despite the admittedly exploitative nature of their operations, multina-
tional factories were a site for self-empowerment. I call such employment 
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“employment of the weak,” a kind of work that provides less powerful 
social groups in a developing country, who otherwise have very limited 
prospects, with opportunities to earn money, respect, and status in their 
families, villages, and workplaces and to develop confidence in themselves, 
regardless of their age, gender, and educational background.
Weapons of the Weak and Worker Agency
Employment at yes can be analyzed using the concept of work styles as 
“weapons of the weak,” a term coined by James C Scott in his discussion 
of peasant worker agency in rural Malaysia (1985). The term refers to 
low-profile, everyday forms of resistance that less powerful social groups 
use to undermine arrangements that result in their circumstances of domi-
nation. Scott examined the ways these workers responded to authority 
in everyday situations and how they used actions such as foot dragging, 
false compliance, desertion, feigned ignorance, and sabotage as tactics 
or “weapons” to mitigate repressive situations (1985, 29). According to 
Scott, unlike rioting or protesting, these forms of resistance involve little 
or no coordination or planning and usually avoid direct confrontation 
with authority. Yet they are individual, spontaneous actions that people 
without power use to protect their interests within their limited scope 
for action. Scott’s concept not only emphasizes the centrality of human 
agency even in what seem to be the most unsatisfactory situations but also 
challenges the typical view of low-skilled workers as passive victims.
Other studies similar to Scott’s have highlighted the active roles shop-
floor operators in multinational factories play in the industrialization of 
their developing economies as well as in their own life trajectories (Han-
cock 2006; Harrington 2000; Lal 2011; Louie 2001; Ngai 2005; Ong 
2010; Wolf 1992). These studies have breathed life into characterizations 
of operators, who routinely have been described as voiceless, powerless, 
and faceless unskilled workers exploited by the forces of multinational-led 
development because of their acceptance of low wages and poor working 
conditions. Leslie T Chang, for example, countered this portrayal in her 
study of young workers in multinational factories in China by arguing 
that shop-floor operators are agents of change (2009).
yes has been at the center of debates about development issues in the 
Pacific Islands region in academic journals, newspaper articles, bank 
reports, regional economic reports, and business magazines (adb 2015; 
Aiavao 1992; Chand 2012; Fraenkel 1998; Malua 2009; Peteru 1998; 
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World Bank 1996). The majority of these sources have focused on the 
economic significance of yes at the national and international levels. Only 
a few have examined the experiences of yes shop-floor operators (Grevel-
Lameko 2000, 2003; Tsujita 2002; Liki 2007). Given the thousands of 
Samoan workers who have passed through this factory, their experiences 
and perspectives on yes employment warrant more attention. Consis-
tent with Scott’s concept of weapons of the weak, I aim to emphasize the 
agency of young Samoan workers in the space of multinational operations 
by exploring the ways in which they use their employment as a weapon 
to mitigate repressive situations, protect their interests, and increase their 
opportunities. It also discusses the roles this multinational factory played 
in the life trajectories of early school leavers in Sāmoa and what the loss 
of yes meant to them. 
Approaches
My findings are based on information and narratives collected primarily 
through direct observation while working at yes as a translator and part 
of the management team for six years. In 2010, I was hired as a Japanese-
English translator, and I was later promoted to assistant manager of the 
production-engineering department. In these positions, I got to know yes 
operators and observe their experiences inside and outside the factory. 
Although I did not work on the assembly line as an operator, I was a 
part of the factory, sharing with other employees the sweat, tears, frustra-
tion, and laughter that filled the everyday space of yes. These experiences 
and narratives form a firsthand account of what it is like to be a factory 
worker in contemporary Sāmoa. I collected additional stories from yes 
operators through digitally recorded formal interviews, unrecorded casual 
interviews, and personal conversations with operators both inside and 
outside the factory during fieldwork for my master’s and doctoral studies 
between 2000 and 2007.2 
History and Structure of yes
Yazaki Corporation, yes’s mother company, is a Japan-based multinational 
car parts supplier that operates in 596 sites across forty-six countries and 
employs a global workforce of over 306,000 people (Yazaki Corporation 
2018). While Yazaki develops and manufactures a variety of automotive 
components, its core business has been the designing and production of 
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automotive wiring harnesses, for which the company has the largest world 
market share in the automotive industry. An automotive wiring harness is 
a bundle of wires and data circuits that runs through a vehicle, integrat-
ing electrical circuits and multiple systems. It distributes power and relays 
information to various electrical components, functioning similarly to the 
nervous system of the human body (Yazaki Corporation 2019). Building 
a wiring harness is very labor-intensive since most assembly processes are 
done manually. A large harness is made of more than five hundred cables 
and circuits that are bundled together and wrapped in insulated tape by 
human hands and then attached to different branches. This manual assem-
bly process is considered the most flexible and cost-effective method to 
accommodate a large range of part numbers, vehicle models, and options 
that require specific sets of wiring harnesses. Minimizing the cost of labor, 
therefore, is crucial for harness makers like Yazaki to remain competitive 
in the cutthroat global car parts industry. Yazaki established its first over-
seas manufacturing plant in Thailand in 1962 and later shifted most of its 
harness manufacturing operations to less industrialized countries to take 
advantage of low wages.3 
In the late 1990s, Yazaki headquarters decided to relocate its har-
ness manufacturing plants from Adelaide and Melbourne in Australia 
to Sāmoa when the Australian locations became less attractive for har-
ness production. In 1985, the Australian government initiated a Motor 
Industry Development Plan that reduced tariffs on imported goods for the 
domestic automotive manufacturing industry. This plan aimed to improve 
the competitiveness of the industry and encouraged car parts suppliers 
in Australia, including Yazaki Australia, to outsource their labor-inten-
sive products to other locations with cheaper labor costs and then import 
them back into Australia. At that time, the minimum wage in Australia 
was au$10–17 (approximately us$8–9) per hour, whereas in Sāmoa, the 
minimum wage was only sat$1 (us$0.40) per hour (Malua 2009, 118). 
In addition to the higher wages paid to Australian workers, Yazaki also 
faced union disputes at its Melbourne plant (Fraenkel 1998, 52). Given 
such circumstances, Sāmoa was able to compete strongly with Australia 
on the basis of low wages and a nonunionized labor force.
Initially, Indonesia, Fiji, and Sāmoa were shortlisted as potential relo-
cation sites. Indonesia offered the cheapest labor pool, and Fiji was geo-
graphically closest to Australia, but Sāmoa had the most stable politics and 
an enthusiastic government. The Samoan government offered Yazaki vari-
ous tax exemptions, free lease of government land, and the construction 
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of a factory building, in addition to a moderate-size cheap and nonunion-
ized labor pool (Aiavao 1992; Malua 2009; Sasabe 1994). Furthermore, 
Sāmoa was in an advantageous position because products manufactured 
in Sāmoa could be exported duty-free to Australia under the provisions 
of the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agree-
ment. Another factor in favor of Sāmoa was that Yazaki management 
was familiar with Samoan workers who had been employed at the Yazaki 
New Zealand plant and were recognized as responsible employees (Malua 
2009, 118; Tsujita 2002, 70–71). 
In 1991, Yazaki began operations in Sāmoa as a subsidiary of Yazaki 
Australia, with 1,327 employees serving at three different locations 
while the Samoan government worked to complete the construction of 
a 269,000-square-foot factory building in Vaitele (Yazaki Corporation 
1991). In 1995, this factory became an independent subsidiary of Yazaki 
Corporation Asia and Oceania Group and gradually increased the number 
of employees to meet expanded production volume from its three clients: 
Toyota, Holden (formerly General Motors-Holden), and Mitsubishi—all 
in Australia. Between 1991 and 2007, the company employed an aver-
age of around 2,200 workers per year, with a peak of 3,500 workers in 
1996. However, by mid-2007, business declined when Toyota Australia 
became its sole remaining client, so yes reduced the number of employ-
ees in Sāmoa. After 2012, employees numbered around 800. Despite this 
decline, from the time of its establishment until its closure, yes remained 
the largest private sector employer in the country. According to yes’s 
human resources (hr) office, the last employee identification (id) number 
issued for a wage worker was 66,302, meaning the company had hired 
at least that many people in its history. This illustrates yes’s significant 
contribution to job creation during its twenty-six-year period in Sāmoa, a 
country whose total population is approximately 195,000.
At its closure, yes had 740 Samoan workers (with an average age of 
26), 3 Japanese expatriates from Yazaki headquarters, 1 Filipino expa-
triate from Yazaki Philippines, and 2 locally hired Japanese staff. About 
60 percent, or 450, of the total number of employees were shop-floor 
operators who worked on the assembly line and built wiring harnesses. 
yes operators were always young, with an average age of 20–23 over the 
company’s history in Sāmoa. The majority were early school leavers who 
dropped out of school at about age 14 or 15. In the early years of the 
company, yes operators—especially those working on the final assem-
bly lines where harnesses were laid out, bundled, and taped together on 
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the conveyor by hand—were predominately female. Male operators, on 
the other hand, took on the more automated processes in preassembly, 
where wires were cut, twisted, jointed, and crimped with terminals by 
machines. Traditionally, the gender ratio for the final assembly lines was 
90–95 percent women to 5–10 percent men. In later years, however, men 
increasingly engaged in manual processes on the final assembly lines. As 
a result, the gender ratio among yes operators became more equal over 
time, ending with a ratio of 65 percent women to 35 percent men. Such 
a change may reflect an increased demand for wage employment among 
Samoan male youth who, in rural households, usually do unpaid farming 
and fishing. Initially, manual assembly work seems to have been perceived 
as a “female” job, but the male operators I interviewed came to see the 
operator position as an available employment opportunity. 
Working Conditions
Shop-floor operators’ working conditions were difficult. Located in a 
poorly ventilated concrete and corrugated iron factory, the shop floor was 
both hot and humid with an average temperature of approximately 90–95 
degrees Fahrenheit. In this stifling environment, operators were required 
to stand and assemble wires on the conveyor line while the production 
leaders stood behind them and periodically shouted at them to work faster 
in order to achieve the targeted quantity. In periods when overtime was 
required until eight or nine in the evening, operators worked for eleven to 
twelve hours a day. Such long hours of work were burdensome, especially 
for those who commuted from other sides of the island and needed to 
catch a bus as early as 4:00 am in order to arrive at the company before 
the starting time of 7:25 am.
A normal workday at yes began with a three-minute “radio exercise,” a 
common practice by factories in Japan to limber up workers before work 
in order to prevent accidents. The company’s regular operation hours 
were from 7:30 am to 5:00 pm Monday through Thursday and 7:30 am 
to 2:10 pm on Fridays. All employees had a twenty-minute tea break at 
9:00 am and a forty-minute staggered lunch break starting at either 12:00 
pm or 12:50 pm. The company provided a free lunch valued at sat$2.30 
(us$0.90). Except for break times, shop-floor operators were required to 
stand all day on the conveyor assembly line. Standing became more intol-
erable when rising temperatures made the atmosphere on the shop floor 
unbearably hot. Ceiling and electric fans were installed at almost all work 
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stations on the shop floor, but some of them were too high to be effective. 
Consequently, operators perspired profusely as they worked at their tasks. 
They often complained about these conditions, particularly compared to 
those in the service department’s offices. One worker explained: “I think 
our wages are not fair because our work on the shop floor is so hard, 
standing from morning ‘till night, and it’s very hot. But they, the ones in 
office, sit down all day in [an] air-conditioned office and get better pay. 
We are the ones that make wires, make money for the company, not . . .
them.” They attributed their complaints about unfairness to the fact that 
40 percent of yes employees worked in service departments and received 
salaries that, as the operators perceived it, were derived from the sale of 
wiring harnesses built by shop-floor operators. However, because low 
wages were one reason the factory shifted to Sāmoa, yes needed to care-
fully manage the cost of labor.
During yes’s last five years, the starting rate for shop-floor operators 
was sat$2.30 (us$0.90) per hour, or about sat$4,800 (us$1,930) per 
year, with an annual pay increase of sat$0.10 (us$0.04). All the shop-
floor operators were weekly wage workers, while salary workers were paid 
monthly and earned over sat$12,000 (us$4,800) per year. Salary workers 
received pay raises based on annual performance and attendance reviews, 
but operators were not entitled to such appraisal. Instead, an operator 
could sit for an examination to become an inspector, which would add 
sat$10.00 (us$3.95) to their regular weekly pay. Or if an operator dem-
onstrated good work performance and attendance, she or he could apply 
for the position of line leader or sub-line leader with recommendations 
from supervisors or current line leaders. The sub-line leader position came 
with an additional weekly pay of sat$40.00 (us$15.80), while line lead-
ers received sat$100.00 (us$39.50) extra per week. Still, these allowances 
were insufficient to classify line leaders as salary workers with annual 
pay increments. For example, one line leader with twenty-five years of 
service was still a wageworker who earned approximately sat$11,000 
(us$4,350) annually.
Another way for operators to increase weekly earnings was to work 
overtime, for which they were paid one and a half times their normal 
hourly rate. yes frequently required operators to work overtime, mainly to 
catch up with production delays caused by order changes from Australia 
that added more variations to products. Such customer changes became a 
priority, and overtime was required due to the geographically distant and 
infrequent shipments between Sāmoa and Australia. Common overtime 
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hours extended the workday to 8:00 pm, 9:00 pm, or 10:00 pm on week-
days and to 5:00 pm on Saturdays. Some operators welcomed overtime 
despite the extra effort because it increased their weekly earnings. Others 
disliked it but felt obligated to accept extra hours due to demands by their 
team leaders. These operators complained that if they did not work over-
time, their leaders would treat them as though they were betraying other 
team members since the work on conveyor lines required collaboration. 
This attitude stems from the fact that the obligation of group conformity 
is instilled at an early age in Samoan society.
Whether workers were willing or unwilling, overtime was a physical 
burden when required on consecutive days. At the busiest times, manu-
facturing continued until as late as 10:00 pm every day or every other day 
on weekdays and until 5:00 pm on Saturdays. During such periods, opera-
tors were exhausted from working long hours. They got home late and 
were sleep deprived. Even though the company provided transportation 
home by bus or taxi for those working overtime, it often took significantly 
longer than ordinary transportation services because employees living in 
different areas were dropped off one by one. Some workers did not arrive 
home until after midnight and still had to be ready by 4:30 am to catch 
the first bus to work. Thus, views on overtime varied. As one worker 
explained: “I usually [get] home really late and work on Saturdays, too, 
so I don’t have much time to see my family. But that’s ok because when we 
have lots of overtime, we can make more money. This job is very good.” In 
contrast, another worker shared the following: “Sometimes I finish work 
early and [go] home, but my children don’t want to come to me because 
I’m not at home most of the time. They still like me, but when they wake 
up, they always go to gramma. . . . I feel sad sometimes.” According to 
one Samoan manager, many workers requested that the company consider 
providing sleeping quarters at the factory to avoid the long commutes, but 
this request was denied for security reasons.
Initially, the company provided overtime transportation for free. This 
was an incentive especially for operators from villages far from the fac-
tory who could thereby save their return bus fare. However, when Samoan 
labor laws changed and no longer required employers to provide transpor-
tation for overtime workers, the service was no longer free. Because most 
bus services in Sāmoa end shortly after 6:00 pm, the company contin-
ued to provide transportation for overtime workers but began collecting 
bus fares from them. This had the effect of discouraging operators from 
working overtime hours, particularly when bus fares accounted for more 
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than half of their overtime earnings. For example, if an operator from 
Falefā (about an hour’s drive from the factory) worked until 8:00 pm, the 
three hours of overtime would earn her sat$10.35 (us$4), but sat$5.40 
(us$2.10) would be deducted for overtime transport. She would not arrive 
home until around 10:00 pm and would earn only sat$4.95 (us$1.95) 
extra. Overtime work therefore became a strain for many operators.
Because of these less than satisfactory working conditions, the opera-
tor job at yes was low in the occupational hierarchy in status-conscious 
Sāmoa. yes operators were sometimes even taunted by village peers who 
looked down on their employment in a factory and regarded teaching, 
nursing, and office work as more prestigious jobs (Grevel-Lameko 2000; 
Tsujita 2002). Some operators were uncomfortable with the reputation of 
their employment, so they commuted wearing regular clothes and changed 
into the operator’s light blue uniform when they reached the factory. One 
operator shared her mixed feelings regarding her employment, saying, “I 
like my job, but I don’t want my children to work at the factory. I want 
my daughter to go to college and become a teacher because although pay 
is not so good, it’s a good job.” Others had more favorable opinions about 
their employment, comparing themselves positively to their unemployed 
village peers. One worker mentioned this pride and the sense of prestige 
she gained when she heard the government compliment the company: “I 
feel proud of working at Yazaki because I’ve heard some ministers at the 
Parliament meeting were thanking Yazaki for its contributions to Sāmoa. 
They said if there isn’t Yazaki, where will those youth find jobs?” Such pos-
itive views reflected the socializing opportunities of work at yes. Almost 
all employees interviewed cited socializing as the best part of working for 
yes. On assembly lines, workmates bonded as friends in an important 
communal unit. They would chat and joke with one another behind the 
line leaders’ backs, sometimes singing together while working on the con-
veyor. Opportunities to interact socially with workmates came not only 
through working together but also through company events. Some work-
related events aimed to improve production quality, while social events 
sought to improve the attendance of operators.
One work-related event was the ceremony for the monthly Best Line 
Award, which was given to the assembly line with best performance 
among all fifteen lines. The lines competed to achieve the targeted product 
quantity with the lowest number of defects and the highest line-member 
attendance ratio. The best line was announced as part of a monthly morn-
ing assembly held in the multipurpose area after morning exercises. At the 
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award ceremony, the line leader of the winning line received a certificate 
and a trophy, usually from the vice president of yes or a Japanese manager. 
Each member of the winning line received a free meal ticket for a special 
lunch worth sat$5.00 (us$2.00) for a whole week. This prize was consid-
ered the most effective incentive to motivate operators to come to work 
every day. Some line leaders were viewed as gifted comedians and would 
do something other employees considered funny, like forcefully kissing or 
hugging a Japanese manager when he presented the award, to make the 
audience laugh. Such an event was seen as a little fun for operators before 
the start of another tough workday. At the same time, the competition 
helped build a strong line identity, group cohesion, and close friendships 
among members of the same line.
Besides work-related events, the company also held annual social events 
including a sports day, ping-pong and mū (Samoan chess) tournaments, a 
Christmas celebration, and an end-of-year ceremony. The sports day was 
an annual day-long event held at the Marist St Joseph’s Stadium. All yes 
employees, including managers, were divided into four groups to compete 
in different games and enjoy each other’s company. Ping-pong and mū 
tournaments were held in yes recreational areas, and many employees 
played these games every day during breaks.4 The Christmas celebration, 
which was held on a workday morning near the end of November, began 
with the lighting of a giant Christmas tree installed on the shop floor. 
Each department performed Samoan dances, Christmas carols, and skits 
and then took photos with a jumbo decorative Santa. The end-of-year cer-
emony was held on the last workday of the year. It began with a thank-you 
speech by the vice president, followed by prizes for perfect attendance, best 
line of the year, and best operators of the year. Everybody received a pre-
mium gift with the company logo (eg, a watch, umbrella, or water cooler) 
and a special lunch box. In addition to these annual events, the company 
held special ceremonies to mark company anniversaries and to celebrate 
company accomplishments, such as when it achieved zero customer com-
plaints or when it received the Best Supplier Award from Toyota Austra-
lia. Through these social events, employees developed friendships beyond 
those with their immediate fellow workers on assembly lines.
For many young operators, working at yes was their first time ever 
away from the strict oversight of their families, or from supervised com-
munal work organized by villages. They were free to meet with people 
from other villages and church communities. Many of them found a boy-
friend, girlfriend, or future spouse in the factory. In fact, five out of seven 
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production department managers met their spouses in the factory. For 
young operators, yes was an ideal place to spend time together while on 
breaks and without parental interference. For all employees, regardless of 
age and position, yes was a unique place of socialization where hundreds 
of members from different villages mingled with each other and shared 
the factory space every day for long hours, which resulted in the forg-
ing of a village-like communal bond. yes benefited from such bonds and 
social incentives, which mostly outweighed employee grievances about the 
workplace and encouraged them to continue working. 
Pyramid Society and Complex Layers of Resistance
yes had an overt pyramidal power-class system in place based on occupa-
tional hierarchy. In this pyramid, complex layers of resistance to author-
ity and control occurred at different levels and between strata. Although 
shop-floor operators were the bottom of the hierarchy, they were able to 
use weapons of the weak to resist authority and escape from repressive 
situations.
Nominally, the president of yes was at the top of the organization’s 
power-class pyramid. However, because the president of yes doubled as 
the president of Yazaki Australia and resided in Melbourne, in practice, 
the vice president of yes in Sāmoa superseded him at the top. Tradition-
ally, Yazaki headquarters appointed Japanese members from Yazaki Japan 
to both positions. A Samoan general manager was on the second stra-
tum, followed, in descending order, by senior managers, departmental 
managers, assistant managers, supervisors, line leaders, sub-line leaders, 
and then operators. Managers were both Samoan and Japanese. In power 
relations, operators most commonly complained about harsh practices by 
their immediate bosses, the line leaders and sub-line leaders.
Leaders on the assembly lines were responsible for monitoring the per-
formance of operators, ensuring quantity achievement, and maintaining 
product quality. In pursuing their responsibilities, leaders often shouted at 
their team members throughout the day. Some leaders stood right behind 
the operators who were causing a delay in the conveyor line and shouted 
at them to work faster. This was sometimes counterproductive when pres-
sure from leaders made operators very anxious and thus slowed down their 
hand movements. A vicious cycle emerged when leaders shouted louder 
and more furiously and operators worked less efficiently. In Samoan cul-
ture, young people are accustomed to taking orders from their elders, but 
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in factory conditions, they often resent the authority of leaders in the same 
age group.
Many operators were of the opinion that leaders’ conduct was the main 
cause of resignation among operators. One of them explained: “I know 
many operators used fa‘alavelave [family obligations] as a reason for 
resigning. They say so because if they want to work again at yes, it will 
be okay with their leaders. But their real reasons for resigning were their 
unhappy relationships with their leaders. They can’t stand them because 
leaders are too much, overusing their authority, but operators cannot do 
anything, so they quit.” While some operators quit their jobs, a more com-
mon weapon of the weak operators used to mitigate repressive situations 
was false compliance. In the absence of line leaders, some operators broke 
production rules and skipped one or more assembly process steps in order 
to complete given tasks faster and achieve the target quantity. Because 
they had gone through a series of trainings, operators were well aware of 
the production rule that bypassing designated manufacturing procedures 
was strictly prohibited and could result in a defective product. Neverthe-
less, some operators continued to violate the rule. This did not necessarily 
mean that they did not care about product quality but rather that they 
were desperate to escape the pressure from leaders to achieve targets. For 
this reason, even though the yes quality assurance team took numerous 
countermeasures to prevent operators from bypassing designated proce-
dures, some operators continued to skip essential steps.
When the quality assurance team identified pressure from line leaders 
as a possible driving factor behind operators’ noncompliance with manu-
facturing procedures, the issue was taken up at many management meet-
ings. Japanese managers repeatedly recommended not using strong verbal 
admonitions, while some Samoan managers supported the leaders’ tough 
conduct, believing it was the most effective local method to discipline 
young operators. Once, as strongly recommended by a Japanese senior 
manager, a no-shouting rule was passed at a management meeting and 
implemented on the shop floor. Production leaders initially observed the 
rule, especially when Japanese managers were present on the shop floor, 
but old ways soon reappeared. Such a case was typical for yes, where rules 
for shop-floor workers initiated by Japanese managers were not observed 
for long without support from Samoan managers. This implies that almost 
no Japanese authority was recognized on the shop floor even though these 
Japanese members held managerial positions at yes. Due mainly to cul-
tural and language barriers, Japanese managers rarely interacted directly 
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with operators, resulting in their placement outside the yes hierarchy of 
power and control. Production members, including operators and line 
leaders, were more observant of the directives of Samoan managers than 
those of Japanese managers. In such circumstances, Samoan managers, 
who understood the realities of authority on the shop floor, could influ-
ence adherence to decisions made by Japanese managers.
In addition to false compliance, operators had other available weapons, 
including foot dragging, feigned ignorance, and dissimulation. Some oper-
ators deliberately worked slowly before break time so that they would not 
need to start assembling a new product and could pack up faster to go to 
lunch or to go home. When their non-compliance with production rules 
was discovered, many operators dodged questions about manufacturing 
procedures or feigned ignorance, saying, “I never knew such a process.” 
When a defective product was found in their line, many operators denied 
that they had disregarded production rules or skipped assembly steps.
Line leaders also dissimulated when a defect was found on their line and 
their supervisors and managers accused them of failing to control opera-
tors effectively. In extreme cases, when faced with criticism about defects 
from those in authority, line leaders made all of their line members dis-
simulate in order to discredit the accusation. However, dissimulation was 
not always successful for line leaders, and some were terminated for such 
practices. Unlike operators, line leaders, who were not the weakest in the 
authority structure, could not use weapons of the weak effectively. Line 
leaders were in some instances in the more vulnerable position because 
they had to deal with pressure from their supervisors to control line per-
formance and observe the rules, and from operators using weapons of the 
weak to challenge their authority. It was not uncommon to see line leaders 
crying behind the conveyor after being scolded by their managers.
Being at the bottom of the power pyramid, operators had limited scope 
for action but still resisted authority by exercising false compliance, foot 
dragging, and dissimilation to mitigate oppression at work. Apparently, 
some aspects of the working conditions for the shop-floor operators were 
less than satisfactory. Even so, the young operators were able to use their 
yes employment as an available weapon to expand their life choices. 
Employment of the Weak: Accessibility
Education qualifications and previous work experience were not required 
to become an operator at yes. When the company needed to hire more 
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operators, an hr manager would make an announcement to current work-
ers in the factory requesting that they let their family members and village 
peers know about the new vacancies. Interested applicants would be asked 
to come to the factory on the following Monday at 8:00 am wearing a 
white top and black bottom and bringing a copy of their birth certificate 
and their id number from Samoa National Provident Fund (snpf). By 7:00 
am on the designated Monday, a long queue of applicants would be stand-
ing by the yes front gate. At 8:00 am, applicants would be called in to take 
an entrance examination involving simple computational questions. An 
hr officer would then interview them individually and review their birth 
certificates and snpf numbers. Typically, no questions were asked about 
education background or previous work experience. The main purpose 
of the interview was to assess whether the applicant was physically and 
mentally fit for full-time work and able to understand simple instructions 
in the Samoan language. In effect, yes hired all applicants with these abili-
ties, regardless of the examination result. A few days after the interview, 
the names of prospective workers would be posted on the yes bulletin 
board, and the current workers who had been their referees would convey 
the results to the applicants. This would complete the recruitment pro-
cess, and the newly employed operators would start work the following 
Monday. This simple process for operator recruitment encouraged young 
people, particularly early school leavers, to seek jobs at yes.
According to a youth employment study by the Samoa National Youth 
Council (snyc), most of Sāmoa’s youth, especially those from rural areas, 
lack comprehensive access to information on employment opportunities 
(snyc 2017, 73). This is because few mechanisms are available to village 
youth and most jobs are in the urban area. Sources like the Samoa Public 
Service Commission Circular and the Samoa Observer newspaper adver-
tise job vacancies, and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour 
operates an online job-search service,5 as does the Makeki Online Face-
book page.6 However, these sources are not easily accessible to rural youth 
due to limited access to newspapers and the high cost of Internet access 
(snyc 2017, 59). In this regard, yes had an effective user-friendly method, 
relying on word of mouth and family networks to inform job seekers. The 
company promoted recruitment through current workers’ connections, 
which easily reached village youth in different districts. Those wanting a 
job at the factory could simply ask current yes workers in their villages 
about openings.
According to the snyc survey, about 70 percent of the young respon-
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dents identified limited education and lack of work experience as the main 
obstacles to finding employment (2017, 51–52). Despite these disadvan-
tages, early school leavers were encouraged to get jobs at yes because 
of the company’s lack of qualification and experience requirements and 
because they knew people just like themselves were working at the fac-
tory. For example, one yes operator told me, “There are different jobs in 
Sāmoa, but other jobs need references or certificates and connections to 
apply. But here, Yazaki, you just sit for an exam, and if you pass, you can 
work. It’s good, good for people in villages, because they never worked 
before, have no reference.” As another operator explained, “Many young 
people are looking for jobs, but they can’t find it because they dropped 
out from school. This company makes it very easy for them to get a job 
and very helpful because they need money, too.” Highlighting the impact 
of identifying with current employees, one young operator from south-
ern ‘Upolu described her motivation to join yes: “My neighbor was just 
like me until three months ago. She was staying home and just helping 
her mother, but now she’s working at Yazaki and earns some money. So 
I thought I should go there and get some money like other village girls 
working at Yazaki.” Peer networks encouraged early school leavers to 
seek jobs at the factory. These applicants were not deterred by the tough 
working conditions of operator jobs, which they were likely to have heard 
of already. They still applied, seeing a yes job as an opportunity. Although 
the majority of yes operators were early school leavers, reasons for leav-
ing school were complex and often related to poor academic performance, 
lack of interest in school, financial difficulties, and family obligations. No 
current research cites the prospect of employment at yes as a reason for 
leaving school.
yes was established in Sāmoa to take advantage of the country’s pool 
of cheap and nonunionized labor, a practice typical of multinational cor-
porations in the world capitalist system. However, the factory workers 
did not necessarily perceive yes as exploitative, and young operators with 
few options to earn money viewed yes employment in positive terms. 
Other jobs for unqualified young people in Sāmoa are scarce, pay the 
same wages or less, and are often on a casual or daily basis. The only 
other option such youth have is to participate in unpaid family labor, 
such as household chores, farming, and fishing. In today’s Sāmoa, villages 
receive government services including piped water and electricity, but cash 
is needed to pay for these services and for other items now regarded as 
necessities. Furthermore, churches and traditional ceremonies require a 
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considerable amount in cash donations. According to a study on church 
contributions by Cluny Macpherson and La‘avasa Macpherson, one typi-
cal mainstream church receives an average fortnightly monetary offering 
of sat$2,500 (us$950) from its members, in addition to labor and com-
modity donations (2011, 321). Such contributions take up a substantial 
part of a household’s income, and if income is inadequate to meet a tacitly 
understood amount to be donated, a family may even borrow money from 
commercial lenders to make up shortfalls (Macpherson and Macpherson 
2011). The demand for cash is strong, but Sāmoa has a high underem-
ployment rate and limited wage employment opportunities. Therefore, 
for young early school leavers without marketable skill sets, yes was one 
of the few companies that provided a much-needed opportunity to earn 
money. 
Employment of the Weak: Rehiring
Although low-paid factory laborers like those at yes are often described 
as victims of a multinational corporation’s quest for the lowest wage, yes 
operators were able to take advantage of the labor demands of harness 
manufacturing that forced the company to change its recruitment policy. 
Initially, yes had a strict policy that forbade rehiring as a way to retain 
operators by discouraging them from resigning once trained. Eventually, 
however, in the context of the Samoan labor market, yes allowed changes 
to its rehiring system that gave operators flexible work choices.
In the climate of cutthroat competition, the performance of car parts 
suppliers like yes is measured by good quality, low cost, and just-in-time 
delivery. To remain a competitive supplier, the company hired most of its 
operators at minimum wage to keep production costs low. To achieve pro-
duction goals, yes needed to retain a sufficient number of trained opera-
tors and maintain production efficiency. However, keeping an adequate 
number of operators was one of the most difficult challenges the company 
faced, as operators generally did not stay with yes for long. More than 
half of the operators employed left the factory within their first year, over 
75 percent left within three years, and only about 10 percent worked at 
yes for longer than ten years. 
Japanese managers were frustrated by the high turnover rate and won-
dered why young workers in Sāmoa gave up their jobs so easily, given 
their very limited employment opportunities. A Samoan manger provided 
two main reasons. First, their weekly earnings from yes were not high 
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enough to be essential to the survival of their families. In Sāmoa, the cost 
of living is high due to an influx of imported goods and the high cost of 
basic services. Operators’ earnings supplemented their household incomes 
but could not cover all the necessities of daily life. Second, most Samoan 
households have a range of strategies to survive economically. In addi-
tion to wages, remittances from overseas family members and subsistence 
farming and fishing are means of livelihood, while the customary land 
system secures their access to land. For these economic reasons, the level 
of operators’ commitment to yes employment was low.
Moreover, daily life in Sāmoa is full of unexpected communal demands, 
such as funerals, church hall openings, village cleanups, hosting visitors, 
or looking after a sick grandmother or a sister’s baby. Young adults are 
expected to do work for and to give priority to these family, church, and 
village activities. In this cultural context, the young adults’ labor is an 
important household resource to contribute to events, and their service is 
often considered more important than earning a minimal wage from the 
factory. Therefore, operators left yes when more important life events 
came up. 
The company needed to modify its recruitment policy to cope with the 
intermittent commitment of young Samoan workers. Eventually, a pro-
duction manager convinced the top management that rehiring trained 
operators would increase production efficiency by reducing the required 
training period. Usually, the company would provide one month of train-
ing to make new operators productive and efficient industrial workers. 
The training included modules on Yazaki corporate philosophy, yes rules, 
manufacturing processes and techniques, and Japan-based work ethics. 
Rehiring former operators reduced the needed training period from one 
month to one week, just long enough to refresh their skills and the tech-
niques previously acquired. This system allowed the company to secure 
sufficient operations-ready manpower to meet customer demands on time.
At the same time, the rehiring system became a convenient tool that 
allowed young workers to move in and out of the factory according to 
their circumstances and needs for immediate cash. When operators joined 
yes for the first time, they typically had high expectations for earning 
much-needed cash income. But when they encountered hardships, such 
as scolding by line leaders or disappointment over low pay, or when an 
important family event came up, they would quit the job. Then, sometime 
later, after unsuccessfully looking for another job or becoming tired of 
helping in the household or on the family farm and feeling the need for 
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cash, they would return to yes. In most cases, they would wait until the 
company called for the return of “formers,” or former operators. When 
these operators reapplied, yes rarely checked the circumstances under 
which they left the job. Therefore, by the following Monday, they were 
generally rehired. The company had no limitation as to how many times 
they would rehire the same operators. Some operators were rehired more 
than five times. The most common reason for their return to yes was 
boredom at home. Other returning operators said that the jobs they took 
after yes were not as much fun and that they missed their coworkers at 
the factory.
Although this rehiring system was adopted in order to secure opera-
tions-ready manpower, it had the effect of increasing the turnover rate 
among operators and lowering attendance. yes had a strict attendance 
policy that required that every employee gain a supervisor’s approval for 
a leave of absence by at least the previous day. Those who failed to show 
up for work for three days without approval faced termination. This rig-
orous rule was based on the company’s time-sensitive production system. 
Because a shortage of operators not only caused delays but also affected 
the quality of the products, production leaders repeatedly reminded work-
ers of the attendance policy. Operators were aware of the policy, but many 
were terminated for disobeying it.
On average, 75 percent of the operators who left yes had not resigned 
but rather had been terminated. Of all terminations in 2016, 70 percent 
were for breaking the three-day absentee rule. This suggests that most 
operators were not afraid of being terminated. For some operators, dis-
missal was preferred over resignation because resignation required an 
employee to go through tedious processes, including completing an exit 
interview and returning id cards and uniforms. They knew that those who 
had been terminated could come back to yes as formers as long as their 
dismissal was not due to misconduct, such as stealing company tools. They 
also knew that, in practice, the company did not thoroughly check the rea-
sons for termination and often even rehired those who were terminated 
for stealing in order to meet a required number of trained operators. This 
meant that operators, knowing that they could return as formers anytime, 
could easily quit when they were dissatisfied with their working condi-
tions or when they had more important priorities. In this respect, quitting 
the job was a weapon of the weak that the workers used to protect their 
interests. At the same time, the rehiring system provided operators with 
increased bargaining power with their employer, the multinational-owned 
436 the contemporary pacific • 31:2 (2019)
factory, because they knew the company depended on an adequate num-
ber of operators.
The rehiring of operators represented some of the adjustments the com-
pany reluctantly made in the Samoan context in order to maintain its 
production efficiency as a competitive supplier in the global automotive 
market. Because harness production required intensive manual labor, yes 
had to retain a core number of operators to meet the supply schedule its 
clients demanded. By 2011–2012, holding on to the required number of 
operators became more challenging because growth in Sāmoa’s private 
sector, particularly in wholesale and retail trade, opened more low-skilled 
jobs for local youth (mcil 2013). This trend narrowed yes’s options, lead-
ing to their acceptance of a rehiring policy. In this way, young factory 
workers became active agents who could shape the company policy and 
expand their options.
Employment of the Weak: Empowerment
A third aspect of the employment of the weak is the way yes employment 
enabled young unqualified women and men to develop a sense of self-
worth, empowered by the opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities. 
In Sāmoa, a person’s traditional family rank in a village and their age, 
gender, and education level play key roles in determining their social sta-
tus. Youth, particularly young women, from traditionally low-status fami-
lies have relatively few opportunities for social mobility. Working at yes 
 created such opportunities. On the shop floor, the occupational hierarchy 
was built on capabilities and skills rather than family rank, gender, age, 
and education background. In this hierarchy, some young line leaders were 
given a sizable degree of authority over those who might be older despite 
the Samoan tradition that younger people honor and respect their elders. 
These cultural values made some operators reluctant to accept promotion 
to a line leader or sub-line leader position because they were uncomfort-
able giving orders to older operators or criticizing their work. However, 
many young operators welcomed the chance to jump the traditional age 
and status hierarchy by gaining promotion on their own merits, becoming 
leaders, possessing power, and receiving higher wages. One young opera-
tor, for example, said, “I wanna move up to be a line leader or even a sub 
leader. I wanna be a leader and have an allowance like them. I know I 
can do it, so I’m trying my best to achieve good performance.” All lead-
ers of the assembly lines originally joined yes as operators and attained 
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their leader positions as a result of good performance and attendance. 
Young operators were motivated when they realized that age, gender, and 
traditional status values did not hinder the opportunity to progress in the 
factory.
Although leader positions were open to both genders, line leaders were 
disproportionally female, even after more men became operators. One 
female operator said, “In our society, we young girls have to show respect 
for others and have no opportunity for our own. We have no freedom 
to do what we want to do. But here is different. I can see we have more 
chances and freedom here at this company. Like our supervisor, I can be 
like her, to make my life better and earn more money for my family.” As 
she perceived it, opportunities existed for young women to progress at 
yes. Five out of seven production managers and supervisors were female. 
All of them initially joined the factory as young operators and climbed 
their way to the top. One woman supervisor said, “I was an operator and 
promoted to be a sub leader because I mastered all my tasks and always 
achieved the production target. I was promoted to be a line leader and 
then supervisor because I had a good record of performance and atten-
dance. I’d never missed work. I believe the most important thing as a 
worker is, whatever the top says, we obey or at least try our best to follow 
their instruction. This is my respect to the company, and I got this posi-
tion as a reward.” As she explained, common attributes of production 
managers and supervisors were the ability to lead a team to meet produc-
tion targets, to show obedience to authority and company rules, and to 
maintain good attendance. In addition, according to one Samoan man-
ager, they had a unique capacity for endurance—they did not quit their 
jobs but rather remained with yes for more than twenty years. In fact, the 
majority of the employees who worked for yes longer than twenty years 
held supervisory positions, with exception of those who did not wish 
to take leader positions. In this sense, not quitting the job was a viable 
weapon these leaders could use to protect their interests, although it took 
some time to be effective. Shop-floor leaders served as role models for 
young operators by demonstrating a pathway to a better position, higher 
pay, and power and authority—opportunities young women seldom had 
outside the factory. 
Another rare opportunity yes provided was an office job for early school 
leavers without any qualifications. Vacant positions, including office jobs, 
were open to all, regardless of age or gender. Vacancy announcements 
were usually posted on the company bulletin board located by the security 
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gate; both current employees as well as outsiders could apply. However, 
the company gave priority to applications from current workers primarily 
because they were accustomed to the unique yes culture, including its early 
starting time and frequent overtime demands. Applications from current 
employees mainly took account of the applicants’ work performance and 
attendance. This recruitment policy created a new avenue for operators 
to attain a longed-for office job. One operator who won a job as a docu-
ment controller in the production office said: “One day, I saw an opening 
for a document controller position, so I applied for it. I was called for an 
interview with hr manager and got the job because I have good record 
of performance as cutting machine operator, always achieving the target, 
and I have good attendance, almost 100 percent. This company gives us 
more opportunities than any other places in Sāmoa. If this is a government 
job, you’ll never get it unless you have high qualifications or you know 
somebody there. People like me who have no family connection never get 
an office job like this.” This woman had left school early and did not have 
work experience prior to starting at yes. She seized the chance to work in 
an air-conditioned office after several years of working on the hot shop 
floor as a cutting machine operator. As an office worker, she wore a differ-
ent colored uniform—office workers wore white and operators wore light 
blue. Wearing the white uniform symbolized her higher status than that of 
operators in the yes occupational hierarchy, an achievement that others 
envied and that motivated others to work toward an office position. 
Some youth, even those with relatively good education backgrounds, 
took operator jobs at yes knowing that the company gave preference to 
current employees. They perceived the operator job as a stepping-stone 
to an office job. One financial officer told me: “I have a certificate in 
accounting, but I can’t get an office job at other places because I don’t 
have any connection, so I applied here. I knew I could get a job here easily 
as operator. I didn’t mind to be an operator because it’s only for a while 
and I wanted to apply for an office job when it opened up.” There were 
other operators who did have school or job qualifications working on the 
assembly lines, waiting for an opportunity for a better job. In this respect, 
as one Japanese manager put it, the shop floor operators were a gold 
mine of human resources. The presence of those with better education 
and qualifications did not necessarily reduce office job opportunities for 
operators with more limited education because office jobs in manufactur-
ing-related sections usually went to those with some work experience as 
a yes operator.
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Another factor in building self-worth among yes operators was their 
satisfaction with helping their families and hearing their parents express 
gratitude to them for earning money. One young female operator said, 
“I’m happy and grateful when my father compliments my job in his eve-
ning prayer, saying that because of my hard work we are rewarded and 
our family has some money.” Like this operator, many others thought the 
greatest reward for their employment was their parents’ gratitude. They 
said that working at yes was a way to tausi mātua (support or serve one’s 
parents). 
According to Loia Fiaui and Vao‘au Tuimaleali‘ifano (1997), “tausi 
mātua” refers to the reciprocal obligation between children and parents; 
parents tausi (care for) young children, who then serve their mātua (par-
ents). As children become adults, they in turn assume the role of tausi 
(caregiver) for their elderly parents. In short, tausi mātua is a life duty of 
Samoan sons and daughters. Caring for parents is also reinforced with 
reference to the fifth commandment in the Bible in that children will be 
blessed for honoring their father and mother (Fiaui and Tuilmaleali‘ifano 
1997). Within this belief system, young operators were proud of them-
selves and their factory employment because their wages enabled them 
to serve their parents. They felt their hard work was rewarded with their 
parents’ acknowledgment of their service. Moreover, their wages enabled 
them to financially contribute to fa‘alavelave (which can include gifts of 
money and food) and church donations. Even though wages were low, 
earning money allowed young workers to feel that they too were capable 
and valued members of their families and church communities.
Even if their village peers looked down on the operator job at yes, the 
factory employment was attractive to young early school leavers because 
it provided rare opportunities to gain power and status, earn higher pay, 
be able to financially contribute to the family and church, and perform 
their filial duty of tausi mātua. From their perspective, factory work was 
a source of empowerment that enhanced their sense of self-worth and 
agency. 
Conclusion
In August 2017, Yazaki ceased its twenty-six years of operations in Sāmoa 
as a result of the decline of the car manufacturing industry in Australia 
and its global supply chain, of which yes was a part. The closure of yes 
was a typical example of the flow-on effects of changes in transnational 
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operations, reflecting the critique of the neoliberalism that undermines the 
situation of workers in peripheral economies. However, I argue that the 
history of yes suggests that exploitation may be in the eye of the beholder. 
The Samoan government courted Yazaki Corporation with offers of tax 
breaks and the provision of premises, knowing that low labor costs was 
the key attraction of Sāmoa for this multinational corporation. Within the 
Samoan context, however, yes was eventually forced to revise employment 
policies and to rehire operators who had resigned or been dismissed in 
order to maintain production efficiency and meet customer demands. The 
revised recruitment policy expanded young early school leavers’ options 
for work and increased their bargaining power with the employer because 
they knew the company depended on them.
As Amartya Sen pointed out, development should be seen as a means 
not only to eliminate economic insufficiency but also to enhance the free-
dom of those who lack real opportunities by expanding their capabilities 
and increasing their choices (1999). In this light, employment in multina-
tional factories like yes can contribute positively to development in devel-
oping countries like Sāmoa because it enables many members of less pow-
erful social groups to earn cash income, build self-confidence, and seize 
opportunities that would otherwise be beyond their reach. Despite long, 
hot working hours standing to assemble automotive wiring harnesses, 
and despite pressures from their line leaders, most operators valued their 
jobs at yes. In fact, conversations with yes employees revealed that most 
wished Sāmoa had more multinational factories like yes to provide wage 
employment, especially for early school leavers. They were saddened by 
the factory closure because, although wages were low and the cost of 
 living high, their life opportunities were expanded by their yes employ-
ment. Such positive views complicate critiques of the profit-oriented oper-
ations of multinational corporations searching for places to exploit cheap 
labor. As this study shows, the voices of the young workers themselves, in 
their circumstances of limited opportunity, also need to be acknowledged. 
This Japanese wiring factory has closed, but the aspirations and experi-
ences of yes operators remain an important part of Sāmoa’s economic 
history and should be considered when evaluating the country’s future 
development path.
In the post-yes situation, despite widespread concerns, the negative 
impact of yes’s closure on the Samoan economy does not seem to be sig-
nificant, and the economy is recovering quickly. According to an Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Country Report, an expected low level of growth 
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in the 2017–18 fiscal year due to yes’s closure would rebound the fol-
lowing year due to expansion in the construction industry (imf 2018). In 
the 2014–15 fiscal year, yes accounted for more than 40 percent of the 
country’s total exports, generating sat$50 million (us$19 million) per 
year (Government of Samoa 2016). A major impact on trade was antici-
pated, but a local forwarding agent reported that although business was 
affected by the loss of yes, it is now being buoyed by the growth of other 
industries, including wholesale and retail.
Similarly, yes’s closure does not seem to have had a significant long-
term effect on the underemployment rate in Sāmoa. According to employ-
ment statistics (sbs 2019), the rate decreased by 2.9 percent in the Decem-
ber 2017 quarter. However, it has since recovered, with a positive growth 
of 0.4 percent in the June 2018 quarter and 2.0 percent in the December 
2018 quarter, reflecting the increase in job opportunities in other indus-
tries, including restaurants, accommodations, transportation, and food 
manufacturing. Further, as this study shows, about half of the yes opera-
tors would have quit their jobs within a year anyway, even if yes had 
not closed. As the closure approached, yes provided all employees with 
a transitional support package including various training programs and 
severance allowances to help them prepare for their future careers. As a 
result, some members started their own businesses, while many  others 
found new jobs. For example, my former office mate who participated in a 
fabric-printing training program started a textile business and is currently 
selling her original tie-dye fabrics at local stores in Apia. The majority 
of former production managers and line leaders, along with sixty other 
ex-yes members, are now working at a New Zealand–owned wiring com-
pany that occupies part of the old yes facility in Vaitele. Moreover, nota-
bly, three former yes employees have transferred to Yazaki Japan and 
work for the company’s global training teams.
On 13 December 2017, Prime Minister Tuilaepa Lupesoliai Sailele 
Malielegaoi officially handed over the former yes building to new tenants. 
It officially marked the end of a chapter in Sāmoa’s development history in 
which yes played an important role in its trajectory. For most employees, 
it was the day they lost their company and the workmates with whom they 
had established attachments. For them, the loss of yes was the loss of an 
employment of the weak—a valuable weapon that, even if somewhat lim-
ited, helped them become active agents of change in the trajectory of their 
own lives and development in the context of seemingly irresistible forces 
of multinational operations. 
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Notes
1 Translated by Meleiseā Leāsiolagi Mālama Meleiseā for this article.
2 I collected operators’ perspectives using different methods, including for-
mal interviews, casual interviews, and conversations with operators and other 
employees, but I treat all accounts equally in this paper. For interviews, I obtained 
written consent from formal interview participants and oral consent from casual 
interview participants. For stories collected from conversations and direct obser-
vations, I obtained oral consent from the informants who held supervisory, mana-
gerial, or higher positions, as they might be identified given the small size of the 
local community.
3 In 2017, Yazaki had a total of fifty-five automotive harness manufactur-
ing plants outside of Japan, operating in thirty-one countries including Argen-
tina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Colombia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, India, 
Indonesia, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Paraguay, People’s Republic 
of China, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of China, Romania, Russia, 
Sāmoa, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uru-
guay, and Vietnam (Yazaki Corporation 2018). Wiring harness factories in Japan 
are currently used as pilot facilities for the research and further development of 
lean production mechanisms based on cost-effective and time-saving assembly 
processes.
4 The recreational area located on the shop floor filled a space vacated after 
the loss of clients Mitsubishi Australia and Holden Australia. The area had ping-
pong tables, mū tables, a television, tables and chairs, and a wooden bed. The vice 
president of yes set up the recreational area to provide a space for operators to sit 
down and chat, lie down for short naps, watch rugby games or Filipino dramas 
on television, or play games during tea and lunch breaks.
5 The Samoan Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour’s Job Seeker 
Service is available online at: https://www.mcil.gov.ws/services/employment/job 
-seeker-service/. 
6 Makeki Online, established in 2014, is one of the first and most successful 
online trading forums in Sāmoa: https://www.facebook.com/groups/makekionline/.
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Abstract
Yazaki Electrical Distribution System Sāmoa (yes), a Japan-based car parts fac-
tory, ceased its operations in Sāmoa in August 2017 as a result of an Australian 
government decision to stop subsidizing the automotive industry. yes’s closure 
was a classic example of the flow-on effects of changes in global supply chains 
and illustrates how the neoliberal economy has undermined the circumstances 
of workers in developed and developing countries. This study, however, offers 
an alternative perspective. It explores the meaning of the factory closure from 
the standpoint of young workers in Sāmoa. I collected their stories and voices 
446 the contemporary pacific • 31:2 (2019)
primarily through direct observations and conversations with them while work-
ing at yes as part of the management team for six years. During the company’s 
twenty-six years of operations, yes employed over sixty thousand local workers, 
predominantly young early school leavers. These youth sought employment at 
yes because, unlike most other jobs, the company offered job opportunities for 
school leavers without education qualifications or specialized experience. This 
study examines what the loss of this multinational factory meant to its young 
workers. It portrays the everyday world of shop-floor operators and describes 
how their factory employment contributed to their lives. I argue that from the 
perspective of yes operators, despite the admittedly exploitative nature of their 
operations, multinational factories can be seen as sites for self-empowerment. 
Factory employment provided increased opportunities for less powerful members 
of Samoan society who otherwise had very limited prospects to develop confi-
dence in themselves and earn money and status in their families, their villages, 
and the workplace. 
keywords: Sāmoa, multinational corporations, factory employment, early school 
leavers, weapons of the weak, agency, empowerment
